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When a debtor files for bankruptcy, it’s axiomatic that all creditors, wherever located, must immediately cease their efforts to collect on debts owed to them by that debtor, right? Not necessarily so, says the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, insofar as those creditors and their collateral are located outside of the United States.

The Bankruptcy Protector

Envision a scenario in which you purchased a right of first refusal for a parcel of real estate. That right, as bargained for, would let you purchase the parcel if it was put up for sale by matching any competing bidder’s offer. As a diligent prospective purchaser, you would naturally record that right of first refusal in the appropriate land records. So far so good.

A person in possession of a debtor’s property upon a bankruptcy filing now has more guidance from the Supreme Court as to the effect of the automatic stay. In City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021), handed down on January 14 of 2021, the Court was faced with the issue of whether the City of Chicago (the “City”) was liable for violation of the automatic stay for refusing to return vehicles it impounded pre-petition. Issuing a narrow decision under Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Court held that it was not.

In spring 2020, the Czech Republic, like the rest of the world, was severely affected by the coronavirus pandemic. The spread of COVID-19 outbreaks led to drastic shutdowns and reduced operations in almost all sectors of the economy. The loss of income and suspension of payments threatened to lead to the insolvency of thousands of businesses. So in spring 2020 the Czech Parliament approved temporary statutory measures to prevent the collapse of the business sector due to formal insolvency proceedings (the so-called Lex COVID).

Lockdown, shutdowns, drops in revenue and related negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic faced by companies even still operating and in a healthy state have prompted the Czech government to respond to this situation and implement statutory measures to mitigate such impacts (the so-called LEX COVID), also in the area of insolvency. Most of such measures are only temporary during the extraordinary measures taken by public authorities during the COVID-19 pandemic. LEX COVID, which brings the below-mentioned changes, has already been enacted and came into force on 24 April 2020.

This week’s TGIF takes a look at the recent case of Mills Oakley (a partnership) v Asset HQ Australia Pty Ltd [2019] VSC 98, where the Supreme Court of Victoria found the statutory presumption of insolvency did not arise as there had not been effective service of a statutory demand due to a typographical error in the postal address.

What happened?

This week’s TGIF examines a decision of the Victorian Supreme Court which found that several proofs had been wrongly admitted or rejected, and had correct decisions been made, the company would not have been put into liquidation.

BACKGROUND

This week’s TGIF considers Re Broens Pty Limited (in liq) [2018] NSWSC 1747, in which a liquidator was held to be justified in making distributions to creditors in spite of several claims by employees for long service leave entitlements.

What happened?

On 19 December 2016, voluntary administrators were appointed to Broens Pty Limited (the Company). The Company supplied machinery & services to manufacturers in aerospace, rail, defence and mining industries.

This week’s TGIF considers the recent case of Vanguard v Modena [2018] FCA 1461, where the Court ordered a non-party director to pay indemnity costs due to his conduct in opposing winding-up proceedings against his company.

Background

Vanguard served a statutory demand on Modena on 27 September 2017 seeking payment of outstanding “commitment fees” totalling $138,000 which Modena was obliged, but had failed, to repay.

The recent decision of the Court of Appeal of Western Australia, Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) (Receivers and Managers Appointed) [2018] WASCA 163 provides much needed clarity around the law of set-off. The decision will no doubt help creditors sleep well at night, knowing that when contracting with counterparties that later become insolvent they will not lose their set-off rights for a lack of mutuality where the counterparty has granted security over its assets.