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Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

In an opinion issued on Sept. 20 by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico, Judge David T. Thuma held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not prevent a bankruptcy court from determining whether the automatic stay applies to pending state court litigation. See In re Shook, Case No. 24-10724-t7 (Bankr. N.M. Sept. 20, 2024) [ECF No. 54].

The recent Privy Council decision in Sian Participation Corp (In Liquidation) v Halimeda International Ltd[2024] (SPC) has overturned a principle of English law relating to the interaction between a contractual agreement to arbitrate and traditional insolvency measures where a debt is said to be disputed without substantial grounds.

Another groundbreaking judgment from the ADGM Courts in the NMC matter 📢🇦🇪👨🏻⚖️ and another example of the ADGM Courts drawing important parallels between ADGM and English law.

English proceedings re NMC Health Plc are also ongoing. In his judgment at CFI on 8 July 2024, Sir Justice Andrew Smith found that:

1. The ADGM Courts can make an order in respect of the fraudulent carrying on of the business of a company prior to the time at which that company was continued in the ADGM.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

In Matter of Imperial Petroleum Recovery Corp., 84 F.4th 264 (5th Cir. 2023), the Fifth Circuit was asked to address whether 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) – the federal statute providing for post-judgment interest – applies in adversary proceedings even though 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) doesn’t explicitly refer to bankruptcy courts.

In Matter of Texxon Petrochemicals, L.L.C., 67 F.4th 259 (5th Cir. 2023), the Fifth Circuit held that even if an appeal is equitably moot, the appellate court nonetheless has appellate jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal, without reaching the issue of equitable mootness.