The Bankruptcy Protector

This term, Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan has authored a pair of opinions related to arbitration. The first of these decisions, Badgerow v. Walters, 20-1143, 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022) came down on March 31, 2022, where Justice Kagan, writing for the 8/1 majority, held that a court must have an independent basis of federal jurisdiction to undertake a petition to confirm or vacate an arbitration award.

Section 105 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, titled “Power of Court,” is often cited and used as a “catch-all” provision when requesting certain relief or when a bankruptcy court enters an order granting (or denying) certain relief not prescribed by a particular provision of the Bankruptcy Code. That section provides that a “court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title . . .

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently issued an opinion that calls into question the long-held Barton doctrine following the dismissal of a bankruptcy case and thus the jurisdiction of that court. In Tufts v. Hay, No. 19-11496 --- F.3d ----, 2020 WL 6144563 (11th Cir. Oct. 20, 2020), the court considered where a litigant may bring suit against counsel appointed by a bankruptcy court after the bankruptcy case was dismissed.

In 2007, Philadelphia Entertainment and Development Partners, LP dba Foxwoods Casino Philadelphia (“Plaintiff”) secured a gaming license from Pennsylvania for $50,000,000 with the understanding that it open its casino business within one year. Plaintiff failed to do so and, despite a number of extensions, Pennsylvania cancelled and revoked the gaming license in December 2010. Without a gaming license, Plaintiff found itself in chapter 11 by spring of 2014.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued an opinion in Delaware Trust Company v. Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc., Wilmington Trust, N.A. (In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.) on June 19, 2019, in which it addressed distributions of assets pursuant to the waterfall provision of an intercreditor agreement in a chapter 11 reorganization.

The recent Supreme Court decision in Merit Management Group LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. eliminated any circuit split or confusion over the language of the section 546(e) safe harbor.

InGrayson Consulting, Inc. v. Wachovia Securities, LLC (In re Derivium Capital LLC), 716 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2013), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined whether certain securities transferred and payments made during the course of a Ponzi scheme could be avoided as fraudulent transfers under sections 544 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court upheld a judgment denying avoidance of pre-bankruptcy transfers of securities because the debtor did not have an “interest” in the securities at the time of the transfers.

On January 10, 2012, a Florida bankruptcy court ruled in In re Pearlman, 462 B.R. 849 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012), that substantive consolidation is purely a bankruptcy remedy and that it accordingly did not have the power to consolidate the estate of a debtor in bankruptcy with the assets and affairs of a nondebtor. In so ruling, the court staked out a position on a contentious issue that has created a widening rift among bankruptcy and appellate courts regarding the scope of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over nondebtor entities.