The Supreme Court of Canada delivered its reasons today in 9354-9186 Québec inc. v Callidus Capital Corp., 2020 SCC 10, after having unanimously allowed the appeals from the bench on January 9, 2020. Davies represented the principal – and successful – appellants in this matter.1
In its reasons, which were delivered by Chief Justice Wagner and Justice Moldaver, the Supreme Court laid out key principles for the conduct of insolvency proceedings (including proceedings under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act [CCAA]):
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in 9354-9186 Québec Inc. v Callidus Capital Corporation unanimously overturned a unanimous decision of the Québec Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court’s decision, released on January 23, 2020, was issued from the bench with reasons to follow.
Dans une décision unanime rendue séance tenante le 23 janvier 2020 dans l’affaire 9354-9186 Québec Inc. c. Callidus Capital Corporation, la Cour suprême du Canada a infirmé une décision unanime de la Cour d’appel du Québec. Les motifs de la Cour sont à venir.
Trademark licensees that file for bankruptcy protection face uncertainty concerning their ability to continue using trademarks that are crucial to their businesses. Some of this stems from an unsettled issue in the courts as to whether a licensee can assume a trademark license without the licensor’s consent. In In re Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc., 2015 BL 44152 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 20, 2015), a Delaware bankruptcy court reaffirmed that the ongoing controversy surrounding the “actual” versus “hypothetical” test for assumption of a trademark license has not abated.
A debtor's decision to assume or reject an executory contract is typically given deferential treatment by bankruptcy courts under a "business judgment" standard. Certain types of nondebtor parties to such contracts, however, have been afforded special protections. For example, in 1988, Congress added section 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code, granting some intellectual property licensees the right to continued use of licensed property, notwithstanding a debtor's rejection of the underlying license agreement.