Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.
Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.
Business headlines have warned of a potential “chilling effect on buyouts” as a result of the decision recently issued by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in In re: Nine West LBO Securities Litigation (Dec. 4, 2020). Contrary to the views of some other commentators on the decision, we do not believe that the decision is likely to chill leveraged buyout activity, to upend how LBOs have been conducted, or to significantly increase the potential of liability for target company directors selling the company in an LBO.
With businesses focused on the impact of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic on current and future liquidity, balance sheet and cash flow concerns, and an expected decline in the level and profitability of business activity in these difficult and uncertain times, in many cases attention has turned to the issue of the duties and responsibilities of directors to creditors when a corporation is financially troubled and is either approaching insolvency (the so-called “zone of insolvency”) or becomes insolvent.
On January 15, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) held in In re Trump Entertainment Resorts that section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to reject an expired collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) affirmed the order of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.) approving a settlement and dismissal of a chapter 11 case by way of a “structured dismissal.” A structured dismissal is, simply, the dismissal of the bankruptcy case preceded by other orders, such as an order approving a settlement or granting releases, which survive dismissal of the case.
On May 4, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the order of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dismissing the appeal of chapter 13 debtor Luis Bullard for lack of jurisdiction.1 The Court held that the order of the Bankruptcy Court denying confirmation of Bullard’s proposed chapter 13 plan was not a final order from which Bullard could immediately appeal as of right.2 The Court reasoned that, while confirmation of a plan can be said to fix the rights and obligations of the parties in a way that alters the status quo, d
In a battle over proper venue for the chapter 11 cases of In re Caesars Entertainment Operating Company, Inc.
On October 29, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissing as equitably moot appeals filed by three individuals (the “Appellants”) in the chapter 11 case of In re BGI Inc. f/k/a Borders Group, Inc.
On September 30, 2014, in In re SemCrude, L.P.,1 the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s decision, held that direct partnership distributions by debtor SemGroup, L.P. (the “Debtor”) and indirect partnership distributions by its general partner, SemGroup G.P., L.L.C., to certain limited and general partners could not be avoided as constructive fraudulent transfers.